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Abstract: 
 
Based on panel data of 58 countries, of which 22 Inflation Targeters and 36 non Inflation 
Targeters, over the period 1980-2003, this paper highlights the effect of Inflation Targeting –
IT- on Fiscal Discipline –FD-. We make four contributions to the literature. Firstly, by 
applying the 2SLS on the data, we estimate the effect of IT on central government FD as 
measured by Structural Primary Fiscal Balances. Secondly, we found that the effect of IT on 
FD takes place only on the Developing Countries sub-sample. Thirdly, the positive effect of 
IT on FD is stronger when the Central Bank –CB- adopts “Partial” IT rather than Full-Fledged 
IT –FFIT-. Fourthly, the positive effect of IT on FD is heterogeneous: it is conditional to the 
degree of CB independence, the level of financial deepening, the instability in the terms of 
trade and the length of exposure to IT -the effect is not immediate but cumulative over time-. 
Our results are robust to alternative specifications - using Propensity Score Matching Method, 
"System GMM" estimator, LAD estimator and applying 2SLS on annual data rather than 
triennial averages data- Our results could contribute importantly to the debate about the 
relevance of IT adoption by Developing Countries -due to their bad fiscal stances-.The results 
suggest that these countries could successfully adopt IT and improve their fiscal stances, 
provided that they adopt it gradually, establish flexible framework allowing them to react 
temporally to short-term external shocks and accompanies it with a greater independence of 
their CB and a deepening of their financial systems. 
 
JEL  Codes : E52, E58, E62, E63. 
 
Keywords: Inflation Targeting, Fiscal Discipline, Central Bank, Monetary Policy, Fiscal 
Policy, Public Debt Monetization, Developing Countries. 
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« Inflation Targeting … requires the policymakers to deepen reforms, enhance transparency 
and improve fiscal policy. » (E. Croce a M.S. Khan, F&D, p.51, 2000 September) 
 
1. Introduction 
Since its adoption by New Zealand in 1990, Inflation Targeting –IT- is becoming the 
framework of reference for the conduct of the monetary policy –MP-. Nowadays, according to 
Rose (2007) classification, supplemented with a more recent one (Freedman & Laxton, IMF, 
April 2009), we identify 28 inflation targeters –ITers- countries, of which 18 developing 
countries and 10 developed countries. One of the factors explaining this movement stems 
from the relative inability of the other alternative MP regimes to stabilize inflation and output 
at short term. Historically, in order to tackle the inflation bias inherent to the so-called time 
inconsistency problem, central banks –CB- have used alternatively 3 MPs regimes. Certain 
have targeted intermediate variables such as aggregated money growth or exchange rate. In 
the first case, central bankers expect to anchor inflation anticipations, indirectly via the 
control of aggregated money growth. This MP strategy relies on the conviction of the 
existence of a narrow relation between money supply and inflation -quantitative theory of 
money-. However, because of the globalization vague of the 1980s decay and especially the 
financial innovations mechanisms, one assisted to an increase in the instability of the money 
velocity, so that money targeting has appeared as less effective in achieving inflation and 
output stabilization. In the second case, CB targets exchange rate, i.e. they fix their exchange 
rate relatively to the money of a partner country. But due to several reasons, of which the 
increase of the international capital flows and the difficulty to maintain the parity of change, 
exchange rate targeting has become less viable and less effective in achieving inflation and 
output stabilization1. Finally, since the beginning of 1990s, industrialized economies, then 
developing ones have decided to target directly the anticipated inflation. This MP framework, 
as summarized by Mishkin (2000), is mainly characterized by 5 criteria2: “1) the public 
announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation; 2) An institutional 
commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals are 
subordinated; 3) An information inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just 
monetary aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy 
                                                 
1
 Except corner solutions like Currency Board or Monetary Union regimes which also proved relatively viable. 
2
 In the literature, there are also Svensson (1997, 1999) and Truman (2003) definitions of IT. 
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instruments; 4) An increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through 
communication with the public and the markets about the plans, objectives, and decisions of 
the monetary authorities-; 5) An increased accountability of the CB in achieving the inflation 
target”. The arguments in favor of this regime hold in the flexibility of reaction it confers to 
central bankers to deal with shocks affecting the economy. This flexibility of reaction appears 
via a judicious mix of discretion and rule, synthesized in the expression “constrained 
discretion” regime (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997). 
In the empirical literature, IT adoption seems to have lead to several macroeconomic 
benefits3. Most of the empirical studies have found that IT has allowed an attenuation of 
inflation level, volatility and persistence and output volatility (Truman, 2003; Petursson, 
2004; Vega & Winkelried, 2005). But surprisingly, any study has analyzed a possible effect of 
IT adoption on the fiscal stance. The existing literature mentions fiscal surplus only as a 
precondition4 for a successful adoption of IT, stressing that large fiscal deficits lead to fiscal 
dominance that represents a serious threat for the viability of IT. Similar arguments have been 
outlined by the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic (Sargent & Wallace, 1981) and the fiscal 
theory of prices (Woodford, 1996, 2000). Nevertheless, the observation of the fiscal statistics 
(Graph1) reveals that the fiscal discipline precondition has not been met by most of the ITers 
at the beginning of their IT: they recorded diverse fiscal stances, ranging from negative to 
positive fiscal balances, with the majority revolving 0%.    
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Graph1: Primary Surplus at the adoption of IT
 
                                                 
3
 Except the seminal paper by Ball & Sheridan (2005) who found any significant effect of IT on inflation and its variability on a sample of 20 
industrialized economies. Amore recent one is Brito & Bystedt (2009) who found that IT has detrimental effects on the real output growth 
and volatility in the emerging countries. 
4
 Agénor (2002); Carare, Schaechter, & Stone (2006); Truman (2003); Calvo & Mishkin (2003)  
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A more acute analysis -Graph 2- shows that even though ITers did not meet the fiscal surplus 
precondition at the starting date of their IT, on the one hand they experienced in the post-IT 
period an improvement of their fiscal stances and on the other hand, their fiscal adjustments 
were larger than the non ITers. Therefore, it seems rational to assume that CBs having 
adopted IT while their governments enjoyed bad fiscal stances were urged to undertake fiscal 
adjustments in order to enhance the credibility of their commitment to the inflation target. It 
looks like as if before the adoption of IT, the fiscal precondition is not enough constraining 
while after the adoption of IT, the fear of breaching the inflation target makes real the 
necessity of disciplining the conduct of the fiscal policy. What could be the mechanisms 
working under these presumptions? Three potential mechanisms are postulated to explain 
these intuitions. Firstly, IT could help avoiding the monetary financing of the public debt; 
secondly, ITers could also mobilize more tax resources through an attenuation of the so-called 
Oliveira-Keynes-Tanzi effect. Finally, a disciplinary impact of IT on fiscal policy conduct 
could emerge from the fact that IT implies adopting Flexible Exchange Rate and that Flexible 
Exchange Rate could provide more FD than Fixed Exchange Rate (Tornell & Velasco, 1995, 
2000). But do these theoretical and statistical correlations, corroborated by a more rigorous 
econometrical analysis? The main objective of this paper is therefore to evaluate the effect of 
IT adoption on the conduct of Fiscal Policy. Obviously, assessing the effect of IT raises the 
question of the endogeneity of IT adoption. Indeed, the estimation of the disciplinary effect of 
IT could be polluted by reverse causation bias since higher primary fiscal surpluses might 
simply reflect a “selection on observables” problem, i.e. that countries recording higher FD 
are those which more likely adopt IT, creating false impression that IT truly shape fiscal 
behavior. Furthermore, the omission of relevant variables –unobserved social preferences for 
FD for example-, affecting simultaneously the adoption of IT and FD would lead to a biased 
estimate of the treatment effect of IT on FD. In view of that, we employ the instrumental 
variables approach – controlling for time fixed effect and for the potential observables 
determinants of FD - to break any link between IT and the errors terms. For robustness 
purpose, we also use the propensity score matching method which allows us to evaluate 
consistently the average treatment effect of IT through the identification of the relevant 
counterfactual to the ITers group. We also run system GMM estimations which not only 
makes possible to control for the endogeneity of several variables but also to take into account 
the persistence in the FD process. Finally LAD estimates are considered to check the 
robustness of the evaluation regarding the presence of outliers. We make four contributions to 
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the literature: Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to evaluate empirically the 
impact of IT on FD. Secondly, we find that the positive effect of IT upon FD is stronger on 
the developing countries subsample. Thirdly, we show that the effect of IT upon FD varies, 
depending on the form of IT adopted, strict or partial (soft). Fourthly, we investigate the 
existence of heterogeneities in the impact of IT on FD, i.e. the circumstances under which the 
effect is more or less pronounced. Our estimates put in evidence that the impact of IT on FD 
depends on the longevity of the IT framework, the CB degree of independence, the level of 
the financial development and the volatility in the terms of trade. The fulfillment of the 
theoretical preconditions before the adoption of IT does not affect the impact of IT on FD. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we discuss the relationship 
between IT and FD. Section 3 displays the empirical framework while section 4 discusses the 
dataset and shows the main results. Section 5 and 6 respectively explore the specific case of 
the Developing Countries and the presence of heterogeneities in the relationship between IT 
and FD. Section 7 briefly considers robustness checks. In section 8, we discuss policies 
implications and conclude. 
2. Theoretical underpinnings of the Effect of Inflation targeting on 
Fiscal Discipline. 
In this section, we review the arguments postulating the existence of a link between IT and 
FD.  
2.1. The channel of public debt monetization  
The unpleasant monetarist arithmetic (Sargent & Wallace, 1981) and the fiscal theory of 
prices (Woodford, 1996, 2000) have shown that in some countries, the control of inflation is 
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not solely a monetary phenomenon, but depends crucially on the control of fiscal deficits. 
There would be a kind of interaction, if not complementarity between monetary policy (MP) 
and fiscal policy (FP) in determining the inflationary performances. Woodford (1996, 2000), 
suggests that such an interaction occurs mainly in "Fiscal Dominance5” regimes. There are 2 
types of fiscal dominance. The first, which is standard, is more frequent in the Developing 
Countries where the CBs still are not totally independent. In these contexts, the government 
fiscal requirements determine the size of the fiscal deficits to be financed. This funding gap is 
assigned to the CB as the level of seignoriage revenue to be generated via money creation. In 
such a situation, if the CB commits fully to a low single digit inflation target, then the 
government can no longer rely on inflation tax to finance its deficits, as low inflation would 
be synonymous of low inflation tax collection and therefore low seignoriage revenues through 
money creation. So the adoption of IT would imply for the government to find other sources 
of financing than inflation tax. Then, IT should encourage the government to reinforce its tax 
collection system and rationalize its public expenditures (Minea & Villieu, 2008). Concerning 
the second type of fiscal dominance, it is neither specific to Developing Countries, nor to non 
independent CBs. It takes the form of government pressures on the CB to use monetary policy 
(MP) as a tool to keep short-term interest rates at low levels and then reduce the governmental 
borrowing cost. In such situations, if the CB adopts IT, there would be a serious 
incompatibility between the government strategy and the monetary policy. In fact, IT implies 
using short-term interest rate as the main instrument of MP (Svensson 2001). So in the case of 
inflationary pressures, to contain the demand and keep inflation on track, the CB should react 
aggressively by increasing the short-term interest rate; so there would be a conflict between 
the CB –willing to raise interest rates to meet its inflation target- and the governments -willing 
to keep interest rates at low levels to contain the burden of its debt-.In order to ensure the 
private agents that the MP will not be subordinated to the fiscal policy, so the government 
would discipline its fiscal management by reinforcing its ability of tax collection and 
rationalizing its expenditures. A similar argument has also been mentioned by Calvo & 
Mishkin (2003) who suggest that in order to increase the confidence of the private agents 
about the real desire of the CB to meet its inflation target, it becomes imperative for the 
government to reinforce its fiscal institutions in order to avoid potential debt monetization 
which would inevitably lead to the collapse of the IT framework. 
                                                 
5
 These are regimes characterized by the subordination of the other objectives of the CB to the assistance of government budget financing. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.20 
 
7 
 
2.2. Attenuation of the Keynes-Oliveira-Tanzi effect 
IT may, by containing inflation at low levels, affect the tax mobilization, and hence the 
government fiscal balance. Indeed, there are for some taxes, a time lag between the date of 
imposition and the date of tax collection, so that the real value of tax revenue collected is 
eroded by inflation (Keynes-Tanzi-Oliveira effect, see Tanzi, 1992). Therefore, by 
committing to low single digit inflation target, the CB could help mitigating this Keynes-
Tanzi-Oliveira effect. Thus, assuming that this beneficial effect of IT on the tax mobilization 
is not fully offset by increased government spending, then IT should be accompanied by 
beneficial effects on the budget balance.  
2.3.  Full-Fledged IT: Flexible Exchange Rate and Fiscal Discipline 
Full-Fledged IT implies abandoning the intermediate targets such as Exchange Rate. In fact, 
IT implies the CB to have a flexible exchange rate in order to send to the private agents a 
clear signal about its objective, namely its entire devotion to inflation stabilization. 
Furthermore, Tornell & Velasco (1995, 2000) have shown that contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, if the Fiscal Authority is impatient, i.e. discount the future heavily, then Flexible 
Exchange Rate would provide more FD than Fixed Exchange Rate. In fact, with flexible 
exchange rate, imprudent fiscal policies would lead to immediate consequences on the foreign 
exchange market, because large fiscal deficits would drive up interest rates which would 
make the exchange rate appreciated, while with fixed exchange rate, the punishment of 
imprudent fiscal policies is delayed to subsequent period, namely at the politically costly 
collapse of the peg6. So, the welfare cost7 of bad fiscal policies appears at short-term with 
flexible exchange rate while with fixed exchange rate it is postponed to longer term. 
Therefore, depending on the relative impatience of the government vis-à-vis the welfare cost 
of bad fiscal management, Flexible Exchange rate would provide more or less FD. Since FFIT 
implies adopting flexible exchange rate, then FFIT would be a source of FD in the case of an 
impatient fiscal authority. 
 
                                                 
6
 But in the case of a country which has sufficiently low reserves and no recourses to debt finance, then an imprudent fiscal policy would 
lead immediately to a collapse of the peg, so fixed exchange rate and flexible exchange rate exert the same fiscal discipline. 
7
 With flexible exchange rate, the welfare cost inherent to the appreciation of the exchange rate is a loss of competitiveness of the 
economy while with fixed exchange rate, the cost of a collapse of the parity is a loss of credibility of the CB. 
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3. Econometric Analysis 
In this section, we will present the econometric model and the estimation techniques. 
3.1. Econometric Model 
3.1.1. The baseline model 
Firstly, we estimate the following equation:  
ittitititti fXOGITPFB εβββ ++++= 321                (1) 
Where  is  Primary Fiscal Balance of country i in period t,  a Dummy variable equal 
to 1 if in period t the country i practices IT, 0 otherwise -Exchange Rate Targeting or Money 
Targeting-.  is the Country’s i output gap ratio in period t; we introduce  to be able 
to estimate the effect of IT on Primary Fiscal Balance, adjusted for business fluctuations, i.e. 
the effect of IT on Structural –Discretionary- Primary Fiscal Balance8.  represents a vector 
of control variables. We have retained those mentioned in the literature as influencing the 
fiscal balance: the Political Stability9, the variables determining fiscal mobilization -
Agricultural Value Added, Openness, level of Economic Development proxied by Real GDP 
per capita, Chelliah & al. (1975)- and the Urbanization Rate (Edwards & Tabellini (1991))10. 
The time Fixed Effects are captured by tf  : these times fixed effects are included to capture all 
the time varying characteristics affecting uniformly all the countries11. is the Random 
Error.  
 
3.1.2. Taking into account the longevity of the regime 
Given the delays in the transmission of the MP effects, it seems plausible to assume that the 
effect of the adoption of IT upon FD is not immediate, but cumulative over time, the 
disciplining effect adding up from period to period. Furthermore, the length of time during 
                                                 
8
 Indeed, with such a specification, 1β is the estimated effect of IT on the budget balance at the mid-point of the business cycle, since at 
this point, the output gap ratio is null. It would have been more judicious to calculate directly Cyclically-Adjusted-Budget Balances (CAB) 
indicators, but such an exercise is handicapped by the lack of disaggregated data –as our sample includes developing countries-. 
9
 Political stability data are from ICRG 
10
 Most of the variables are from IMF World Economic outlook, IFS and Word Bank WDI. 
11
 Note that the inclusion of country fixed effects is inappropriate, as our variable of interest IT dummy varies little over time. 
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which the CB has practiced IT could enhance the credibility of its anti-inflation fight, the 
confidence of the public vis-à-vis the CB commitments being boosted over the years, 
allowing the CB to meet its inflation target, and then trigger the positive effect on the FD via 
the channels stemming from a low inflation as described above. Then, we adopt a more 
flexible form of (1) to take into account the fact that the effect of IT upon the FD depends on 
the longevity of the practice of IT by the CB. becomes , a variable which 
takes the value 1 in the year of IT adoption, 2 one year after the adoption, 3, two years later, 
and so on12. In our sample which ranges from 1980 to 2003, the maximum value for this 
dummy is 14 for New Zealand, which adopted IT in 1990, 0 for all the non ITers and the 
ITers -during their pre-IT period-. (1) becomes (1’): 
ittitititit fXOGITdurationPFB εβββ ++++= 321          (1’) 
 
3.2. The estimation method 
3.2.1. The endogeneity of IT 
Several reasons could lead us to suspect that the adoption of IT is endogenous and therefore 
the estimate of its effect on FD with OLS is biased. First, it is possible that the relationship be 
subject to a bias of reverse causality. Indeed, as we want to show, if IT can improve FD, it 
should be noted that FD could also influence the adoption of CI, because the adoption of IT is 
determined by country-specific variables, including the fiscal balance. By the way, observing 
higher fiscal surplus in the ITers group would simply reflect a “selection on observables” 
problem, i.e. that countries recording higher FD are those which more likely adopt IT, 
creating false impression that IT truly shape fiscal behavior. Secondly, the omission of 
relevant variables, affecting simultaneously the adoption of IT and FD, or the unobservable 
variables contained in the error terms –unobserved social preferences for FD for example- 
would lead to a biased estimate of the treatment effect of IT on FD. Thirdly, the measurement 
errors in explanatory variables -mainly measuring IT with a dummy variable may not well 
characterize IT due to the heterogeneities in the practice of IT by the different CBs- could 
lead to an attenuation bias in the estimation of our relationship of interest. Therefore, an 
identification strategy able to consistently estimate this relationship is necessary. Our 
                                                 
12
  We also try a logarithmic specification of the longevity of the regime and the results remain unaltered –
including the fitness of the data-. 
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identification strategy of the IT treatment effect on FD consists in finding some variables able 
to break any link between the adoption of IT and the error terms, in other words, finding good 
instrumental variables. The only way through which they could affect FD must be indirectly, 
through their effect on IT adoption. Econometrically speaking, these variables should verify 
the following 2 conditions: the non weakness condition and the orthogonality condition. 
These conditions mean respectively that the instrumental variables should be jointly 
significant determinants of IT and should not be correlated to the error terms. We minimize 
the problem of omitted variables by including in the estimation equation the potential 
determinants of FD and we control for time fixed effects. To control for the appropriateness 
of the IT dummy variable to capture the heterogeneities in the IT practice, we use 
alternatively two IT dummies, Full-Fledged IT and Partial IT. For robustness purpose –see 
section 7-, we also use the propensity score matching method which allows us to evaluate 
consistently the average treatment effect of IT through the identification of the relevant 
counterfactual to the ITers group. We also run system GMM estimations which not only 
makes possible to control for the endogeneity of several variables but also to take into account 
the persistence in the FD process. Finally LAD estimates are considered to check the 
robustness of the evaluation regarding the presence of outliers. 
 
3.2.2. The instrumental variables 
We use three instruments: 1) the lagged -1 period- value of IT; 2) the lagged -1 period- value 
of Inflation Rate and 3) the Percentage of Neighbors ITers. The first two instruments have 
been used by Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel (2007). The underlying idea is that since its first 
adoption by New Zealand in 1990, any ITer has yet abandoned IT due to economic duress, so 
that the lagged value of IT could be a good predictor of its current value. The argument for 
using the lagged value of inflation as instrument for IT has been drawn from the literature, 
suggesting that a country should adopt IT when its inflation is reasonably at low level, 
preferably after a successful disinflation (Truman, 2003; Masson et al., 1997; Minella et al., 
2003). Obviously, lagged values make good instruments if and only if there is no serial 
correlation in the errors terms. It is therefore important to note that our dependent variable, the 
primary fiscal balance, i.e. the overall fiscal balance excluding the interest payments allow us 
to avoid a possible serial correlation in the errors terms, since excluding the interest payments 
is synonymous of breaking any link between the past and the current fiscal policies, so 
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avoiding any serial correlation in the errors terms. Concerning the third instrument, we adapt 
it from Miao (2009). The proportion of "neighboring" countries that have adopted IT can be 
an effective instrument for IT because the adoption of IT by a neighbor is not correlated with 
the omitted variables of the foreign countries, but very likely influences the choice of 
monetary regime of its neighbors, due to the pairs or spillovers effects. But what do we mean 
by "neighboring" countries? The proximity criterion considered here is not limited to 
geographic proximity, but extends to the historical, linguistic, cultural, political, commercial 
and economic. For example, the Anglo-Saxons are treated as "neighbors" and the countries of 
the former USSR, today identified as European Emerging Countries are also considered as 
"neighbors". We classify the countries of our sample into 8 groups –see appendix 3- of 
neighbors: the Anglo-Saxons, the Nordic Countries, the Euro area Countries, the Other 
Developed Countries, the European Emerging Countries, the Countries of Latin America, the 
Other Emerging Countries and the Sub-Saharan countries -including the Islands-13. In each 
group, we calculate for each country in each period, the proportion of its partner countries that 
have adopted IT.14 To check the validity of our instruments, standard appropriate tests are run: 
Stock-Yogo’s test15, Shea’s partial R2, Sargan-Hansen’s over-identifying restrictions test.16 
With these 3 instruments, we apply the 2SLS estimator on our data. 
 
4. Data and results 
4.1. The sample 
Our sample is composed of 58 countries over the period 1980-2003. This is an unbalanced 
panel because of missing data. But the econometric estimates mitigate this bias by correcting 
for heteroskedasticity by country. The treatment group –ITers- is composed of 22 countries 
and the control group of 36 countries that target either the Money Growth or the Exchange 
                                                 
13
 The islands have been included in the same group as the countries of sub-Saharan Africa because they share a common characteristic, 
namely that they are all small open economies. 
14
 Note that some countries could be classified in two groups simultaneously, but when such a situation arises, we give the priority to the 
proximity of the structural economic characteristics criterion. For example, the United States of America and Ireland, although both Anglo-
Saxons, have been classified respectively in the other Developed Countries and the Euro area. 
15
 We also ensure that the instruments are jointly significant in the first step equation -see annex 4- 
16
 The results of our estimates -see below- allow us to declare that our instruments are not weak because all the Cragg-Donald’s statistics are 
above the critical threshold, 9.08. Moreover, Shea’s partial R2 is also above the conventional critical threshold, 0.20. Finally, in all our 
estimates, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the random errors. Indeed, the probability for 
the null hypothesis is greater than 10%. For example, in column (1) of Table 1, the P-value of the null hypothesis is 0.6216. Therefore, we 
conclude that our instruments satisfy the orthogonality condition.  
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Rate. Of the 58 countries, 35 are Developing Countries and 23, Developed Countries.17 we 
have grouped our data into three-year averages; we have finally 58 countries on 8 sub-periods 
of 3 years: 1980-1982, 1983-1985, 1986-1988, 1989-1991, 1992-1994, 1995-1997, 1998-
2000 and 2001-2003.  
4.2. Variables calculation 
 Inflation Targeting ( ) 
 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if in year t the country's i CB is ITer, 0 if it 
targets either the Money Growth or the Exchange Rate. But as noted above, all variables were 
grouped into three-year averages, so we recoded the variable , which now takes the value 
1 if between the years t and t +2 the country’s i CB  targets inflation,  0 otherwise18. Appendix 
7 shows ITers list along with their adoption dates. Following Rose (2007), we distinguish 2 
kinds of dates: the default starting dates and the conservative starting dates. The first ones are 
those declared themselves by CBs while the seconds are those considered by analysts as real 
dates from which CBs began meeting the 5 criteria required to classify them as ITers. To be 
able to examine whether the impact of IT on FD differs according to the form of the IT 
adopted, we will characterize the period separating the default starting date from the 
conservative one, as Partial –or soft-19 IT, i.e. the transitional phase during which the CB 
adopts “IT lite” (Carare & Stone, 2006), allowing it to undertake gradually the necessary 
reforms for an ultimate Full-Fledged-IT -Strict IT- adoption. We then use two IT variables, 
Full-Fledged IT –FFIT- and Partial IT to verify that the effect of IT on FD varies according to 
the degree of commitment of the CB to its inflation target. It is also important to note that 
Finland and Spain which adopted IT respectively in 1993 and 1995 abandoned it in 1999 to 
                                                 
17
 The first criterion used for the selection of the countries is the availability of data, particularly on the dependant variable (Primary Fiscal 
Balance). Then, to ensure that both groups are reasonably comparable, we exclude countries with a GDP per capita smaller than the 
poorest ITer one, Ghana (270.48 $ U.S.); we also exclude from the sample the countries whose population is less than the least populated 
ITer, Iceland (283,000 inhabitants). 
18
 If such a recoding is relevant to analyze the effect of IT on FD on a medium-term horizon, it should be noted however that this is a 
drawback, as this attributes the same value to the dummy between t and t +2 to several CBs that have adopted IT in different years, 
t, t +1 or t +2. For example, Canada which has adopted IT in 1992 has the same value of  on the sub-period 1992-1994 than Australia 
which has adopted it only in 1994. To ensure that these three-year averages data do not affect the validity of our results, we will therefore, 
in addition to our main estimates results, run regressions on annual data for robustness purpose. 
19
 By Full-Fledged-Inflation-Targeting (FFIT) we mean a CB which meets all the 5 criteria mentioned above (Mishkin, 2000), while by Partial 
IT we mean all the CBs which lack temporarily at least one of the 5 criteria, but officially consider themselves as ITers. Concretely, when the 
default starting date differs from the conservative one, thus we consider that at the default date the CB adopts partial IT while at the 
conservative date the CB adopts FFIT. Vega & Winkelried call this form of IT, “soft” IT. One could also think of such a gradual adoption of IT 
as “flexible” IT. 
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join Euro zone20, so we treat them as ITers respectively between 1993-1998 and 1995-1998 
and as non ITers after 1999. 
 Fiscal Discipline: Primary Fiscal Balance in % of GDP ( ) 
 
Primary Fiscal Balance of central government as GDP percentage, i.e. the Overall Fiscal 
Balance21 excluding the payments of debt interests, is considered as measure of Fiscal 
Discipline 22(FD). We also consider Debt Ratio in % of GDP for robustness check.  
 
 The output gap ( ) 
We measure the output gap with the following formula:  
 
It is the deviation of the logarithm of real GDP relative to the trend, divided by the logarithm 
of the Real GDP trend. A positive difference corresponds to a phase of high business cycle    
–expansion- while a negative difference corresponds to a phase of low cycle –recession-.23 
 
4.3. The results -on the total sample- 
In columns (1) and (2) of table 1, where we consider respectively as variable of interest FFIT 
and Flexible IT, it appears that although positive, the effect of IT on FD at the mid-point24 of 
the business cycle is not significantly different from zero. In the last two columns of table 1, 
where we take into account the length of time during which the CB has been under the IT 
framework, the positive effect of IT on the structural primary fiscal balances in % of GDP 
                                                 
20
 The European Central Bank (ECB) presents ITers characteristics in reality, but as it does not report officially targeting inflation, so we treat 
it as non ITer.  In fact, the ECB publishes inflations forecasts but emphasize that these predictions are purely indicative and do not 
constitute any commitment regarding the conduct of the MP. Moreover, its monetary framework is hybrid, as it targets both money 
growth and inflation. 
21
 Fiscal data are from Brender & Drazen (2004), IFS and GFS. 
22
 For a detailed discussion on why Primary Fiscal Balance could be preferred to the other Fiscal Performances indicators to analyze FD, see 
(A. Bénassy-Quéré et J. Pisani-Ferry, 1994). Moreover, choosing primary –and not overall- fiscal balance as FD indicator will allow us to use 
lagged values of IT and Inflation Rate as relevant instrumental variables of IT. 
23
 The output trend is obtained by smoothing the series of log real GDP with Hodrick-Prescott (HP 1997) filter.  
24
 At this point, the output gap is zero, which means that we have indirectly the effect of IT on Structural (discretionary) Primary Fiscal 
Balance i.e. the real FD.  
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becomes significant at 1%. Therefore, the disciplining effect of the adoption of IT on fiscal 
management is not immediate, but cumulative over time. Thus, if we consider the half time 
elapsed - 7 years - since the initial adoption of IT by New Zealand in 1990 until the end of our 
period of analysis, 2003, then we can say that a country, recording the average primary fiscal 
balance of our sample (1.178 %), which fully commits to IT would at the end of these 7 years, 
increase its primary fiscal surplus by 0.198 points, which leads to a final fiscal balance of 
1.376 in % of GDP. 
Table 1: Effect of IT on FD: 2SLS on the total sample 
Dependant Variable: Primary Balance in 
% of GDP 
(1)  
 
(2)  (3)  (4) 
Full-Fledged IT (FFIT) 0.323    
 (0.508)    
Partial IT   0.591   
  (0.463)   
FFIT_Regime Duration   0.198***  
   (0.062)  
Partial IT_Regime Duration    0.199*** 
    (0.060) 
Log of Real GDP per capita -0.264* -0.262* -0.290** -0.285* 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
Output gap (HP_6,25) 20.11 19.07 21.06 19.48 
 (12.88) (12.85) (12.86) (12.86) 
Openness 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 Agricultural VA 0.014 0.015 0.003 0.003 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Urbanization rate 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political Stability 0.070 0.072 0.072 0.074 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 357 357 357 357 
Partial R2   0.219 0.203 0.233 0.229 
Hansen test of over-identification 
 (P-value) 
0.6216 0.5911 0.6784 0.6612 
 Cragg-Donald Statistic 
(Stock-Yogo test) 
12.009 11.831 16.421 15.855 
Note: *, **, ***: significant respectively at 1, 5 and 10%. In brackets, standard deviations robust to heteroskedasticity and to error terms 
autocorrelation. The excluded instruments are one year lagged values of IT, one year lagged values of Inflation rate and the % of neighboring 
ITers. In (1) and (2), the variables of interest are respectively FFIT and Partial IT; whereas in (3) et (4) these are respectively the same 
variables but adjusted linearly for the duration of the regime practice.  Constants are included in the estimations 
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5. Do the Developing Countries behave differently? 
The economies of the Developing Countries show specific structural features that could make 
there, different, the effect of IT on FD. Indeed, these countries are characterized by low levels 
of economic and financial development, weak institutional quality and infrastructural capacity 
for inflationary forecasts. They also experience regularly great vulnerability to external 
shocks and sudden movement of capital -"sudden stop "- (Carare & Stone, 2006; Calvo & 
Mishkin, 2003). All these structural weaknesses make hardly credible any decision of IT 
adoption by their CBs, because the public would doubt their ability to keep inflation within its 
target band -or point-. This low credibility enjoyed by their CBs compared to those of the 
Developed Countries implies that any Developing Country which adopts IT must make more 
fiscal adjustments and structural reforms to win the confidence of private agents, which is 
crucial for any successful implementation of IT framework. Therefore, the disciplining effect 
of the adoption of IT on fiscal management should be different in these countries. But, is such 
a presumption supported by the data? To answer this question, we restrict our empirical 
analysis to the Developing Countries sub-sample, consisting of 35 countries, whose 12 were 
ITers until 2003 and 23 which have targeted either the Money growth or the Exchange Rate. 
On this Developing Countries sub-sample -Table 3-, the disciplining effect -without the 
interactive variables- of IT on FD is no more solely cumulative over time, but immediate. In 
fact, in (1) and (2), i.e. when we do not take into account the influence of the length of 
exposure to IT, the effect of IT on Primary Fiscal Balances is significantly positive -whereas 
it was not significant on the total sample- Another interesting result is that the effect of IT is 
more accentuated with the adoption of Partial IT (2) than with the adoption of FFIT (1). 
Indeed, the degree of significance is higher in (2) that in (1); better, when we take into 
account the longevity of the regime, only the gradual adoption of IT improves the FD. In 
summary, we found that in the Developing Countries, the adoption of IT increases 
immediately the primary structural budget balance in % of GDP. Moreover, the disciplining 
effect of IT on Fiscal Management is more pronounced for the countries which adopt 
gradually IT, because, they must undertake more reforms and fiscal adjustments during a 
transitional phase to win public confidence before any credible transition to FFIT. Since the 
positive effect of IT on FD appears significantly different from zero solely on the developing 
countries sub-sample, then we will focus on these countries in the remainder of the analysis. 
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Table 2: Effect of IT on FD -2SLS on the Developing Countries Sub-Sample- 
Dependant Variable: Primary Balance in % 
of GDP 
(1)  
 
(2) (3)  (4)  
 
Full-Fledged IT (FFIT) 1.417*    
 (0.832)    
Partial IT  1.599**   
  (0.623)   
FFIT_Regime Duration   0.529  
   (0.331)  
Partial IT_Regime Duration   0.156* 
    (0.092) 
Log of Real GDP per capita -0.198 -0.252 -0.164 -0.093 
 (0.247) (0.249) (0.247) (0.233) 
Output Gap (HP_6.25) 12.11 11.11 9.224 10.44 
 (14.93) (14.87) (14.72) (14.66) 
Openness -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.0005 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Agricultural VA -0.006 -0.005 -0.012 -0.014 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) 
Urbanization Rate 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Political Stability 0.199 0.160 0.196 0.197 
 (0.173) (0.171) (0.174) (0.172) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 205 205 205 205 
Partial R2  0.2215 0.2095 0.3123 0.3204 
Hansen Test of Over-identification  
(P-value) 
0.5658 0.6624 0.2117 0.2341 
Cragg-Donald Statistic  
(Stock-Yogo Test) 
15.627 16.421 18.111 18.147 
Note: *, **, ***: significant respectively at 1, 5 and 10%. In brackets, standard deviations robust to heteroskedasticity and to error terms 
autocorrelation. The excluded instruments are one year lagged values of IT, one year lagged values of Inflation rate and the % of neighboring 
ITers. In (1) and (2), the variables of interest are respectively FFIT and Partial IT; whereas in (3) et (4) these are respectively the same 
variables but adjusted linearly for the duration of the regime practice.  Constants are included in the estimations. 
 
6. Heterogeneities in the effect of IT on FD : the conditional effects 
6.1. The specification 
Due to the idiosyncrasies, the effect of IT on FD could be different within the developing 
countries. These idiosyncrasies would come from the differences in the structural 
characteristics of these economies (Carare & Stone, 2006; Fraga & al., 2003; Mishkin, 2004). 
In this context, it is necessary to introduce the interaction of IT with these characteristics ( ). 
We regress now (2) on the Developing Countries sub-sample: 
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ittitittiitititit fTITTXOGITPFB εβββββ ++++++= *54321                           (2’) 
 
We explore 4 potential heterogeneities: 1) the degree of the CB Independence; 2) the 
Financial Deepening and 3) the instability in the Terms of Trade and 4) the meeting of the 
Theoretical Pre-conditions for a successful IT adoption.  
1) Much of the influence of IT on FD comes from a mitigation of the monetary financing of 
the budget deficit. But IT adoption is not the only way in achieving such a disciplining effect 
on fiscal management. Making the CB independent vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities may also 
lead to a positive effect on FD since CB independence25 means for the government to 
renounce to any resort to "printing money" or any privileged access to credit to finance a 
deficit of public accounts (Bénassy-Quéré & Pisani-Ferry (1994) and Woodford (2000)). 
Therefore, the independence of the CB should interact complementarily with IT to improve 
the FD. So, we expect a positive effect of the interaction between IT and the CB 
independence26 on the FD. 
 
2) Some papers (Carare & Stone (2006); Miao (2009)) have emphasized the role of financial 
deepening27 in the success of IT, because these are important factors conditioning the 
mechanisms of transmission of the MP rule. Therefore, the ability of ITers CBs to hit their 
inflation targets, and in turn their ability to discipline the fiscal policy, is conditioned by the 
level of financial development. Furthermore, in presence of developed banking system, the 
receipts of seignoriage become insignificant because of their flight to commercial banks. This 
would encourage the governments in such contexts to improve their collection of tax revenues 
and to clean up their public finances management (Minea & Villieu, 2008). So, the financial 
development should interact positively with IT to improve FD.  
 
3) Volatility in the terms of Trade implies the instability in government revenues, particularly 
in the countries where most of the public revenues come from the exports of commodities 
(Cashin & Pattillo, 2000). Moreover, fluctuations in the terms of trade are a source of voracity 
effect, i.e. pressure from all sides for increased public spending, and therefore deterioration of 
                                                 
25
 Note that only operational independence of the CB is required as a precondition for a successful IT adoption (Calvo & Mishkin, 2003), so 
adopting IT do not necessarily imply that the CB is independent. 
26
  We use CB governor’s turnover rate (Ghosh & al., 2003) as an inverse proxy for the CB independence. 
27
 Measured by the credits to private sector as % of GDP (Beck, Kunt & Levine, 2007) 
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public finances (Tornell & Lane 1999). Thus, the positive effect of IT on FD should be higher 
for ITers experiencing less volatility in their terms of trade.  Furthermore, the need to cope 
with external shocks has led ITers to introduce forms of flexibility in their IT implementation-
escape clauses, target bands, longer horizons of the MP, “core” inflation targeting-. But as 
stressed by Bernanke & Mishkin (1997), even though this flexibility allows the CB to cope 
with shocks, it is nevertheless a factor reducing its accountability and transparency, which 
could damage the credibility of its actions and lead to the breaching of its target. This would 
cancel any positive effect of IT on FD stemming from low inflation. Therefore, we expect a 
negative effect of the interaction between IT and the volatility in the terms of trade28 on FD. 
4) As noted above, the literature advocates a minimum of theoretical preconditions to be met 
before a successful adoption of IT. By fulfilling these prerequisites, the CB therefore 
increases the credibility of its actions, crucial determinant of the success of IT. So, it seems 
plausible to assume that the interaction between IT and the meeting of the preconditions lead 
to a positive effect on FD, via the positive effect on FD stemming from a low inflation. To 
test for this, we draw a specification from Lin & Ye (2008) and approximate the fulfillment of 
the preconditions by the estimated propensity scores -see table 5- recorded by each country. 
Then we interact IT with the gap between the propensity score of each country and the sample 
mean propensity score: . With such a specification– see Wooldridge 
(2002)-, the coefficient  gives an estimate of the effect of IT on FD for the average level of 
propensity scores while the conditional effect is captured by .  
 
6.2. The results 
When we introduce the interactive variables -Table 3-, first we find that IT has no significant 
effect -in level- on FD, except in column (2). However, some conditional effects proved 
significant29. The effect of IT conditional to the instability in the terms of trade is not 
significantly different from zero when we consider FFIT -column 1- whereas this effect is 
significant when we consider partial IT -column 2-. This is understandable, since the 
developing countries –which are the most exposed to the voracity effect due to the weakness 
of their institutions- adopt gradually IT most of time -rather than FFIT-. So within the 
                                                 
28
  We measure the volatility in the terms of trade by the standard deviation of the terms of trade growth rate. 
29
 The coefficients of IT and that of the interactive variables are jointly different from zero. Therefore IT influences significantly FD only in 
country having structural economic characteristics different  from zero -or different from the mean propensity score- 
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developing ITers countries, the positive effect of IT on FD would be lower for those 
experiencing larger instability in their terms of trade. 
Table 3:  Conditional Effects of IT on FD (Developing Countries Sub-Sample) 
Dependant Variable: Primary 
Balance (% of GDP) 
(1)  
 
(2) 
  
(3)  
 
(4)  
 
(5)  
 
(6)  
 
(7)  
 
(8)  
 
(9)  
 
(10)  
 
Full-Fledged IT (FFIT) 1.729  0.507  -0.176  0.366  -0.218  
 (1.059)  (0.392)  (0.382)  (0.398)  (0.434)  
Partial IT  0.502**  0.042  -0.120  0.117  0.092 
  (0.247)  (0.112)  (0.191)  (0.139)  (0.269) 
ToT Volatility 0.087*** 0.088***      0.079*** 0.075*** 
 (0.025) (0.026)       (0.027) (0.027) 
FFIT*ToT Volatility -0.041        0.091  
 (0.096)        (0.059)  
Partial IT*ToT Volatility -0.037*        -0.037 
  (0.022)        (0.027) 
Turnover Rate (CB)   -0.006 -0.011     -0.003 -0.010 
   (0.001) (0.010)    (0.010) (0.010) 
FFIT*Turnover    -0.013*      -0.011  
   (0.007)     (0.007) 
Partial IT*Turnover     -0.019***     -0.018** 
    (0.007)     (0.007) 
Credit to Private      -0.013 -0.012   -0.008 -0.015 
     (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.009) 
FFIT*Credit to Private     0.010**   0.005  
     (0.004)   (0.004) 
Partial IT*Credit to Private      0.006*   0.007** 
      (0.003)   (0.003) 
Pscore       -0.569 -0.611 -0.525 -0.591 
       (1.807) (1.901) (1.802) (1.833) 
FFIT*( )       1.294  1.187  
       (1.143)  (1.174)  
Partial IT*( )        0.360  0.358 
        (0.630)  (0.615) 
The other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 205 205 188 188 204 204 143 143 187 187 
Partial R2  0.2105 0.2208 0.2317  0.2301  0.2498 0.2411 0.2213 0.2270 0.2107 0.2098 
Hansen Test of Over-identification 
(P-value) 
0.1933 0.2071 0.4924 0.4916 0.6534 0.6518 0.4803 0.4719 0.1904 0.1921 
Cragg-Donald 
 (Stock-Yogo Test) 
12.196 11.922 13.127 13.107 14.273 14.627 12.417 12.792 12.168 12.339 
Note: *, **, ***: significant respectively at 1, 5 and 10%. In brackets, standard deviations robust to heteroskedasticity and to error terms 
autocorrelation. The excluded instruments are one year lagged values of IT, one year lagged values of Inflation rate, the % of neighboring 
ITers and the products of each of the interactive variables with the one year lagged IT (for the interactive variables). In the odd columns the 
variable of interest is FFIT whereas in the pair columns it is Partial IT. 
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Concerning the independence of the CB– proxied by the turnover rate of the governors of 
CBs-, its interaction with IT has a significant30 negative effect on FD. But as the turnover rate 
is the reverse proxy of the CB independence, then this corresponds to a favorable effect on FD 
-Columns 3, 4 and 10-. For given developing countries ITers, the effect of IT on FD resorts 
stronger for those enjoying greater independence of their CB. The effect of IT on FD, 
conditional to the level of financial deepening is positive and significant -columns 5, 6 and 
10-. This is due to the fact that the loss  
of seignoriage revenues -resulting from low single digit inflation target and partial flight to 
commercial banks in countries with well developed banking system- forces the governments 
to increase their ability to mobilize tax revenues and to reduce budget wasting. The effect of 
IT on FD conditional to the fulfillment of the preconditions is not significantly different from 
zero. Therefore the positive effect of IT on FD is not observed solely in the developing ITers 
countries recording higher propensity scores. 
 
7. Robustness Analysis 
In this section, we adopt alternative specifications to check the robustness of our results. 
 
7.1. Robustness to the estimation method 
 The propensity Score Matching Method 
This method -Appendix 1- aims at identifying, on the basis of observable economic 
characteristics, the relevant counterfactual to the treatment group –ITers-, in order to evaluate 
consistently the Average Treatment Effect of IT on FD. 
 
 Propensity Scores Estimation 
To estimate the propensity scores –table 4-, i.e. the probability for each country i in period t, 
to adopt IT, conditionally to the observable covariates, we consider two types of covariates: 
 
                                                 
30
 But when we introduce simultaneously all the interactive variables, in the case of FFIT, the effect of IT conditional to the CB 
independence becomes insignificant -column 9- 
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• The theoretical preconditions variables 
We retain the Past Inflation Rate -1 lag-, Money growth, the 5 years Turnover Rate of the CBs 
governors -reverse proxy for the independence of the CB-, Real GDP per capita and the 
degree of Capital Market Development. We expect for the effects of the first 3 variables, 
negative signs on the probability of IT adoption. For the last two variables, we expect a 
positive effect. 
• Exchange Rate Targeting Determinants 
We consider the following variables to control for the likelihood that some countries choose 
to target the Exchange rate as an alternative framework for the conduct of their MP: Fixed 
Exchange Rate Dummy31 and Openness. The expected effect of these variables on the 
probability of adopting the IT is negative.  
 
 Matching Results 
The results –table 5- confirm those found with the 2SLS: the adoption of IT affects positively 
the FD, especially on the Developing Countries sub-sample.  
 
Table 4: Probit Estimations of Propensity Scores 
De     Dependent Variable : IT Pscore 
(1) 
Total Sample 
(2) 
Developing Countries Sub-Sample 
Log of Real GDP per capita 0.001 0.479*** 
(0.073) (0.141) 
Inflation Rate (1 year lagged) 0.045* 0.056** 
(0.023) (0.025) 
Turnover Rate (CB) -0.010* -0.012* 
(0.005) (0.007) 
Openness -0.004* 0.050 
(0.002) (0.004) 
Money Growth -0.013 -.0198** 
(0.008) (0.010) 
Fixed Exchange Rate -0.249** -0.382*** 
(0.010) (0.141) 
Stock Market Capitalization 0.008*** 0.001 
(0.002) (0.004) 
Number of Observations 254 166 
Pseudo R2 0.1865 0.2674 
                                                 
31
 Data on Exchange Rate Regimes are from Reinhart & Rogoff (2004) 
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Table 5: Effect of IT on FD: Propensity Score Matching Method 
Dependant Variable: Primary Balance Nearest-
neighbor-
matching 
3-Nearest-
neighbor-
matching 
Radius 
matching  
r=0.01 
Radius matching 
r=0.03 
Kernel matching 
(biweight) 
Total Sample 
Average Treatment on Treated (ATT) 2.0967** 1.2965* 0.8537 1.3304* 1.0242 
 (0.7943) (0.6988) (0.851) (0.7411) (0.7275) 
Number of Observations  (Treated Group) 54 54 54 54 54 
Number of Observations (Control Group) 200 200 200 200 200 
N Number of Observations (Total Sample) 254 254 254 254 254 
Developing Countries Sub-Sample 
Average Treatment on Treated (ATT) 1.7968 1.912* 2.452* 2.602* 2.441* 
 (1.402) (1.051) (1.056) (1.184) (1.126) 
Number of Observations  (Treated Group) 28 28 24 28  
Number of Observations (Control Group) 138 138 138 138 138 
N Number of Observations (Total Sample) 166 166 162 166 166 
Note: *, **, ***: significant respectively at 1, 5 and 10%.In brackets, the standard deviations (bootstrapped with 500 replications). The IT 
variable considered here is Partial IT.  
 
 System GMM estimator 
In the literature it is acknowledged that fiscal balances have certain inertia due to delays in 
establishing a new fiscal policy (Gali & Perotti, 2003). Therefore, we test the robustness of 
our results to the inclusion of the lagged fiscal balance among the covariates, by using the 
estimator of the Generalized Method of Moments -System GMM- (Blundell & Bond, 1998). 
The results –Appendix- remain robust to this new specification. Since the effect of IT on FD 
is more pronounced on the Developing Countries sub-sample, we then focus on it for the 
interpretations. In the short-term, the positive effect of IT on FD is more significant32 when 
the CB adopts gradually IT than when it adopts FFIT. The long term effect of partial IT on the 
structural primary fiscal balances (1.241 / (1 - 0.542) = 2.71) is higher than the short term one, 
which confirms the result found with the 2SLS, that the effect of IT on FD is cumulative over 
time. 
 
 Robustness to outliers -LAD estimator- 
It is important for us to ensure that our results are not led by some outliers -especially on the 
fiscal variables-. Then, we rerun (1) with the Least Absolute Deviation –LAD- estimator33 
                                                 
32
 The precision of the estimates gets better with Partial IT (significant at 1%) than with FFIT (significant at 5%) 
33
 See Wooldridge (2002) 
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which has the property of being robust to outliers, as it estimates a smooth conditional median 
function. The results -Appendix 6- remain robust. 
 
7.2. Robustness to time dimension nature 
Finally, to test the robustness of our results to the time dimension nature -see discussion 
earlier in the presentation of the sample- we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) on annual data -
as opposed to triennial average data-.The results34 remain robust to this new specification. 
 
8. Conclusion and Economic Policy implications  
We have highlighted in this paper, the effects of Inflation Targeting -IT- adoption on Fiscal 
Discipline –FD-, on a sample of 58 countries -Developing and Developed Countries-, 
composed of 22 ITers and 36 targeting either Money Growth or Exchange Rate, over the 
period 1980-2003.These results, obtained by applying the 2SLS estimator, suggest that the 
adoption of IT, relatively to Money Targeting or Exchange Rate Targeting, does not improve 
central government FD on the total sample. The positive effect of IT on FD takes place only 
in the Developing Countries sub-sample-where seignoriage still represents a substantial 
source of government finance-. The adoption of IT in these countries may increase the 
structural primary fiscal balance -as GDP %- by 1.6 points. Indeed, to demonstrate to private 
agents that their CBs will not succumb to government pressure for monetization of public 
debt and in turn violate its inflation target, therefore their governments are prompted to clean 
up their fiscal management through an increase of their efforts to mobilize tax revenues and to 
reduce budget wasting. Moreover, in these Developing Countries -and to a lesser extent on the 
total sample-, the positive effect of IT on FD is stronger when the CB adopts Partial IT rather 
than Full-Fledged IT –FFIT-. So IT encourages countries that have adopted it while they have 
adverse economic structural characteristics to that, to improve their fiscal management during 
a transitional phase –Partial or soft IT-, allowing them to adopt credibly FFIT subsequently. 
Last but not least, we have shown that the positive effect of IT on FD is heterogeneous: it is 
conditional to the degree of CB independence, the level of the financial deepening, the 
instability in the terms of trade and the length of time during which the CB has been under the 
IT framework -the effect is not immediate but cumulative over time-. 
                                                 
34
 Available upon request to the author. 
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Our results are robust to alternative specifications -using Debt Ratio as an alternative indicator 
of FD, using Propensity Score Matching Method, System GMM estimator, LAD estimator 
and applying 2SLS on annual data rather than triennial averages data-. However, these results 
should be interpreted with caution. Indeed, some CBs reports practicing IT but in reality keep 
on pursuing other MP objectives such as the limitations of their exchange rate fluctuations. 
Conversely, other CBs did not report formally targeting inflation, but often present ITers 
characteristics in reality -ECB, Fed-. As the border between the different MP regimes is not 
clearly determined, so our results should be taken with caution. 
The results of this paper have economic policy implications that could contribute importantly 
to the debate about the relevance of IT adoption by the developing countries. Because of the 
importance of seignoriage revenue in their public revenue, one could argue that it would not 
be credible for these countries to adopt IT, as public debt monetization would create 
inflationary pressures that would ultimately result in the inflation target breaching. But our 
results suggest rather that they could successfully adopt IT and improve their fiscal stances, 
provided that they adopt it gradually and establish flexible framework allowing them to react 
temporally to short-term external shocks. By the way, they could stabilize both inflation and 
fiscal policy -therefore macroeconomic stability, which is a key prerequisite for a strong and 
balanced long term growth (Fischer, 1993)-. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Methodological Note on the Propensity Score Matching35 
The objective of this method is to evaluate the treatment effect of IT on FD in the country having adopted it. To 
estimate the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT), we consider the following equation: 
 
D, is the IT dummy;  is the is the value of the outcome –FD- that would have been observed if a 
targeting country had not adopted IT and , the outcome value actually observed in the same country. 
The fundamental difficulty in estimating the ATT is that the second term on the right-hand side of (1), 
( ) is not observable. We cannot observe the FD of an ITer if it had not adopted IT. If a country’s 
targeting choice is random, one can easily obtain the ATT by comparing the sample mean of the treatment group 
(targeters) with that of the control group (non-targeters). However, this method would generate biased estimates 
if the targeting decision is not random. In particular, if the targeting choice is systematically correlated with a set 
of observable variables that also affect the outcomes, then we will have the ‘‘selection on observables’’ 
problem36, which makes traditional linear regression an unreliable method.  
To address the ‘‘selection on observables’’ problem, we make use of a variety of propensity score matching 
methods recently developed in the treatment effect literature. The central idea of matching is to use a control 
group to mimic a randomized experiment. The key assumption needed to apply the matching method is the 
conditional independence assumption ( ), which requires that, conditional on X, the outcomes (FD) 
be independent of the targeting dummy. Under this assumption, (1) can be rewritten as : 
 
where we have replaced ( )with ( ), which is observable. 
To identify the good counterfactual to the treatment group, Rosenbaum-Rubin (1983) suggest matching the 
treated units and control units on their propensity scores, which are the probabilities of policy adoption 
conditional on X and can be estimated using simple probit or logit models. A further assumption needed to apply 
propensity score matching is the common support assumption ( ), 
which requires the existence of some comparable control units for each treated unit. Using propensity score 
matching, the ATT now can be estimated as: 
 
We consider 3 commonly used propensity score matching methods. The first method is nearest-neighbor 
matching with replacement, which matches each treated unit to the n control units that have the closest 
propensity scores. We use n=1 and n=3. The second method is radius matching, which matches a treated 
unit to the control units with estimated propensity scores falling within radius r. We use a wide radius    (r = 
0.03) and medium radius (r = 0.01). The third method is kernel matching, which matches a treated unit to all 
control units weighted in proportion to the closeness between the treated unit and the control unit. 
 
 
Appendix 2: List of the countries  
Developing Countries :  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador,  Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Developed Countries:  Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Deutschland, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italia, Japan, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway,, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United Sates of 
America 
Control group: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroun, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Deutschland, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Greece, Honduras, India, Ireland, Italia, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Morocco, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, panama, Portugal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, United Sates of America, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
                                                 
35
  This note has been entirely adapted from Lin & ye (2007) 
36
 See Dehejia & Wahba (2002) et Heckman & al. (1998) 
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Treatment group: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United Sates of America, Thailand. 
 
Appendix 3: Countries Classification according to the neighborhood criterion 
 
Developed 
Anglo-Saxons  
 
Nordic   
Countries 
 
Euro Area 
 
Other 
developed 
Countries 
European 
Emerging 
Countries 
 
Latin America 
 
Other 
Emerging 
Countries 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa and  Islands 
Australia, 
Canada,  
N. Zealand 
Ireland*, UK 
 
Finland* Belgium USA Bulgaria Argentina South Africa Cameroon 
Iceland Cyprus Japan Czech Republic Bolivia, South Korea Ghana 
Norway Finland* Switzerland Hungary Brazil, India Madagascar 
Sweden Deutchland Singapor Israel Chile Malaisia Nigeria 
Denmark France  Poland Costa Rica Morocco Mauritius 
 Greece   Ecuador Pakistan  
 Ireland*   El Salvador Philippines  
 Italia   Guatemala Sri Lanka  
 Luxembourg   Honduras Thailand  
 Netherlands   Mexico Turkey  
 Portugal   Panama Tunisia  
 Spain   Peru   
    Uruguay   
    Venezuela   
Source: Miao (2009) and author.  *: Ireland and Finland are classified respectively among the Anglo-Saxons and Nordic before 1999, but as 
Euro Area Members after 1999, because in 1999 they have integrated the Euro Area. 
 
 
Appendix 4: Effect of IT on FD: System GMM Estimator 
 Total Sample Developing Countries Sub-
Sample 
Dependant Variable: Primary Balance in % of 
GDP 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
Budget Balance (1 Year lagged) 0.533*** 0.532*** 0.540*** 0.542*** 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.160) (0.158) 
Full-Fledged IT (FFIT) 0.223***  1.229**  
 (0.051)  (0.480)  
Partial IT  0.188***  1.241*** 
  (0.120)  (0.443) 
Log of Real GDP per capita -0.219 -0.578 -0.268 -0.276 
 (0.132) (1.997) (0.195) (0.192) 
Output Gap (HP_6.25) 3.879** 3.842** 16.94 16.88 
 (1.643) (1.640) (19.15) (18.87) 
Openness -0.021 -0.018 -0.012* -0.011* 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.006) (0.006) 
Agricultural VA  -0.021 -0.008 -0.027 -0.027 
 (0.161) (0.163) (0.036) (0.036) 
Urbanization Rate -0.142 -0.149 0.015 0.012 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.021) (0.021) 
Political Stability 0.120 0.118 -0.022 -0.045 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.114) (0.115) 
Number of Obsevations 347 347 198 198 
Hansen Test (P-value) 0.312 0.302 0.123 0.247 
AR(2) (P-value) 0.244 0.239 0.825 0.822 
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Note: *, **, ***: significant respectively at 1, 5 and 10%. In brackets, standard deviations robust to heteroskedasticity and to error terms 
autocorrelation. AR(2) : Probability of 2nd order autocorrelation test of Arellano & Bond. The IT, the output gap and Openness are assumed 
to be endogenous; log of Real GDP per capita, agricultural VA, Urbanization rate 
and political Stability are assumed to be predetermined. 
Appendix 5: First Step Equation                        
 
Appendix 6: LAD Estimator on the total sample 
 
Note: *, **, ***: significant respectively at 1, 5 and 10%. In brackets, standard Deviations boostraped with 500 
replications  
 
 
Appendix 7: Inflation Targeters list 
 
Countries 
 Partial IT: default 
starting date 
Full-Fledged IT: conservative 
starting date 
 
 Australia March 1993 September 1994 
Brazil June 1999 June 1999 
Canada February 1991 January 1992 
Chile January 1991 August 1999 
Colombia+ September 1999 October 1999 
Czech Republic January 1998 January 1998 
Finland February 1993 January 1994 
Hungary June 2001 August 2001 
Iceland March 2001 March 2001 
Israel January 1992 June 1997 
Mexico January 1999 January 2001 
New Zealand March 1990 March 1990 
Norway March 2001 March 2001 
Peru January 2002 January 2002 
Philippines January 2002 January 2002 
Poland September 1998 September 1998 
South Africa February 2000 February 2000 
South Korea April 1998 April 1998 
Spain January 1995 January 1995 
United Kingdom October 1992 October 1992 
Sweden January 1993 January 1995 
Switzerland January 2000 January 2000 
Thailand May 2000 May 2000 
Beyond the end date of our sample 
Indonesia July 2005 July 2005 
Romania August 2005 August 2005 
Slovakia January 2005 January 2005 
Turkey January 2006 January 2006 
Ghana January 2007 January 2007 
 
Sources: Rose (2007) ; Freedman & Laxton (2009).  Note.  +: due to lack of sufficient data on fiscal balances, Colombia does 
not appear in the sample used for our econometric section.  
 
Dependant Variable: 
Primary balance  
(as GDP %) 
(1)  (2)  
Full-Fledged IT (FFIT) 0.209***  
 (0.076)  
Partial  IT  0.212*** 
  (0.074) 
 (0.183) (0.178) 
Output Gap (HP_6.25) 36.07** 37.50** 
 (17.59) (16.23) 
The Other Covariates 
Time Fixed Effects 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Number of Observations 345 345 
Dependant Variable: Full-Fledged IT (FFIT) 
1  Year Lagged IT value 0.628*** 
 (0.0894) 
1  Year Lagged Inflation rate value -0.165*** 
 (0.0580) 
%  of Neighboring ITers 0.034*** 
 (0.011) 
Constant 0.408* 
 (0.235) 
Time Fixed Effects 
The Other Covariates  
Yes 
Yes 
Number of Observations 369 
Adjusted R2  0.543 
F-statistic of joint Significance of the 3 
instruments 
F (3,   172) =   
35.13 
 Prob > F =    
0.0000 
